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Taiwan is like no other place on Earth. That’s not a line from a promotional video or 
tourist brochure. It’s a simple fact of history, politics and international relations. 
Taiwan, with its population of nearly 24 million, is a vibrant liberal democracy and a 
major node in global value chains. Without components designed in Taiwan and 
produced in Taiwanese-managed factories in China and Southeast Asia, many of the 
devices people use every day simply wouldn’t work. Taiwan is an indispensable part 
of 21st-century life. 
But it is not a member of the United Nations and only has diplomatic relations with a 
motley collection of mostly poor countries that rely on it for foreign aid. The country 
has no official military alliances, though the United States Congress statutorily 
required Washington to sell Taipei the weapons it needs for self-defense after the 
U.S formally switched its diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China in 
1979. Taiwan is excluded from all of the world’s major intergovernmental 
organizations or relegated to “observer” status. Many outsiders and even 
international relations experts simply assume that the country will ultimately 
reintegrate with China. 
So when, on Dec. 2, Donald Trump, then the U.S. president-elect, took a 
congratulatory phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, it sparked a 
firestorm of controversy. If the response from China was somewhat 
cautious and measured in tone, the reaction from Western experts bordered on 
apoplectic. England’s Daily Express newspaper suggested that China would invade 
Taiwan before Trump’s Jan. 20 inauguration. The Australian journalist John Pilger 
reiterated his warnings of a potential nuclear war between China and the United 
States, and Australia’s leading security think tank ran a piece that openly 
questioned whether Canberra should maintain its alliance with Washington. 
In response, Trump questioned the meaning and wisdom of America’s long-standing 
“One China” policy, which recognizes only one government as the government of 
China. Before 1979, Washington considered that government to be the one in Taipei; 
since, it has been the one in Beijing. And One China is not just a U.S. policy; at 
China’s—and, until 1979, Taiwan’s—insistence, every country in the world must 
recognize only one government of China. No country has diplomatic relations with 
both. 
The Tsai-Trump phone call seems to have been a one-off stunt, and a second call is 
apparently not in the cards. Soon after taking office, Trump reiterated the One China 
policy, though it is still not clearly defined. The official State Department position is 
that the U.S. does not support Taiwanese independence, but it doesn’t oppose it, 
either. Washington also “acknowledges” the Chinese opposition to Taiwan’s 
autonomy, again without explicitly supporting it. 
So just what does One China mean? After all, the U.S. only recognizes one Canada, 
one Mexico and one government of every other country in the world. Why should 
things be any different for China? Why have a One China policy at all? 
Today, the only real answer is that China insists on it. Beijing refuses to have 
diplomatic relations with any nation that recognizes the government in Taipei, and 
will not be a member of any international organization that accredits the Taiwanese 
state. China is adamantly opposed to any suggestion of sovereignty for the island of 
Taiwan—an unequivocal position with a long backstory that stretches back to the fall 
of the Ming Dynasty. 
The controversy didn’t begin in 1949 with the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) by Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong and the flight to Taiwan of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s defeated nationalists. It began in 1644, when the Qing dynasty 
was born. 
The View From Beijing 
Taiwan is a mountainous island situated some 100 to 125 miles off the coast of 
China’s Fujian province. The two Chinese characters used to represent Taiwan 
mean “terrace bay,” but the actual etymology is more complicated, and not fully 
settled. The Pescadores islands off the western coast of Taiwan have historically 
been considered part of the country as well. 
Taiwan also controls the islands of Kinmen and Matsu near the Fujian coast and 
Taiping in the South China Sea. Though their current status has inevitably been 
caught up in arguments over Taiwan, Kinmen and Matsu were historically part of 
Fujian province. Taiping has no civilian population and is not recognized as an island 
at all under international provisions. 
The indigenous population of Taiwan consists of Austronesian tribes who are 
linguistically and culturally related to other Pacific Islander groups like Melanesians, 
Polynesians and the indigenous peoples of Indonesia. Members of the 16 
recognized indigenous tribes of Taiwan make up roughly 2 to 3 percent of the 
population, or about 540,000 people. Like most indigenous peoples, they have long 
faced discrimination and marginalization and now constitute a seriously 
disadvantaged minority within Taiwanese society. 
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Confusingly, the term “Taiwanese” does not refer to these indigenous people, but to 
the pre-1895 Chinese settlers of the island, who might more accurately be described 
as its first wave of modern colonists. In the early 1600s, Chinese settlers began to 
arrive from Fujian province across the Taiwan Strait, clearing land and displacing 
indigenous tribes in much the same way as English settlers were displacing 
indigenous tribes in North America. The Chinese in Taiwan reached an estimated 
population of 200,000 by the late 1600s. Their descendants, supplemented by more-
recent arrivals from Fujian province, make up the core of the island’s majority 
“Taiwanese” ethnic group. 
Mixed in with the mainly Fujianese settlers were refugees from the wars of the Ming-
Qing transition, beginning with the 1644 overthrow of the native Han Chinese Ming 
Dynasty by the Manchurian Qing Dynasty. In a foreshadowing of China’s 20th-
century civil war, the retreating Ming forces ultimately fled to Taiwan, where they 
held out for 40 more years. The Qing finally subdued the Ming remnants on Taiwan 
in 1683. For the next 200 years—until 1895—Taiwan was nominally part of the 
Chinese Empire ruled by the Qing Dynasty. 
The Chinese diplomatic system that once prevailed in East Asia had a more fluid 
concept of sovereignty than that recognized in the West, resulting in later 
disputes over whether Taiwan was historically part of China. Whatever the reality on 
the ground, it is a matter of diplomatic record that other countries considered Taiwan 
a possession of China, as reflected in several of the “unequal treaties” of the 19th 
century. For example, in the Treaties of Tientsin that ended the Second Opium War 
in 1860, China ceded trading rights on Taiwan to British, French and American ships. 
If China’s 19th-century sovereignty over Taiwan was ever in doubt, it was settled by 
the punitive Treaty of Shimonoseki that Japan imposed on China at the end of the 
1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War. In the treaty, China ceded to Japan three territories: 
part of Liaoning province on the mainland, the island of Taiwan and the Pescadores. 
An indemnity was later substituted for the first of these, but in May 1895, Japanese 
troops arrived to take possession of Taiwan. 
There was significant organized local Taiwanese resistance to the Japanese 
occupation, culminating in the proclamation of an independent Republic of Formosa. 
This is sometimes used to buttress claims that Taiwan was not China’s to cede—
though it was clear that Japan and other countries believed it was. If the short-lived 
opposition movement in 1895 constituted an independent state, it was, like today’s 
Taiwan, one that was not recognized by the rest of the world. Japan ruled Taiwan as 
a colony for the next 50 years, belatedly attempting to integrate it into the home 
islands in 1945 in a vain bid to retain it after the war. 
Taiwan and the Pescadores were restored to Chinese rule at the end of World War II 
in line with allied commitments made at the 1943 Cairo Conference. The handover 
from Japanese to Chinese civil authority occurred on Oct. 25, 1945, following 
Japan’s surrender in World War II. Whatever its convoluted and sometimes troubled 
history, there is no doubt that Taiwan became part of China on that day. The 
maintenance of some form of nominally Chinese sovereignty over the island has 
been continuous ever since. 
 
On the basis of this lineage, the People’s Republic of China—as the only China 
recognized by the United Nations and most of the world—claims Taiwan as its own. 
At the same time, the state that currently governs the island is also a lineal 
descendant of the state that once ruled all of China, but it is not China—and no 
longer claims the right to rule it. 
In any case, it is increasingly anachronistic to call it by its constitutional name, the 
Republic of China. It is, for nearly all practical purposes, Taiwan. 
Taiwan as Taiwan 
Constitutionally speaking, the state of Taiwan is defined as the Republic of China 
(ROC), though the constitution was belatedly updated in 1992 to recognize the 
reality that Taipei governs only the “free area” of Taiwan, Kinmen and Matsu, not the 
entirety of China. Gone is the conceit that the Chinese mainland is “in rebellion” and 
will soon be returned to ROC control. In its official rhetoric, Taiwan retains the legal 
name of the Republic of China, but little else; its internet domain is .tw, and its tourist 
brochures are emblazoned “Taiwan: The Heart of Asia.” 
The ROC government, having lost the Chinese Civil War, retreated from the 
mainland to Taipei in December 1949. Then-President Chiang Kai-shek and his 
nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party were not necessarily welcome on the island. 
Taiwan had only recently been restored to Chinese rule, and Chiang had tightly 
squeezed the island’s fragile economy to generate resources for the war. In 1947, 
there had been major unrest over KMT rule; in the infamous 228 Incident on 
February 28, protests against police brutality were met with severe repression that 
killed around 10,000 mostly unarmed civilians. The event marked the beginning of 
the KMT’s decades-long campaign of suppressing political dissent through martial 
law, known as the White Terror. 
 
Taiwan’s KMT government finally lifted martial law in 1987 and made the transition to 
democracy in 1992. The first opposition candidate to win the presidency, Chen Shui-
bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), took office in 2000 and governed 
until 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou reclaimed the presidency for the KMT. In 2016, a 
DPP leader, Tsai Ing-wen, won the presidency for the second time, and for the first 
time gained a majority in Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan. Taiwan is now 
universally applauded as a stable, competitive democracy with guaranteed freedoms 
and a robust civil society. The KMT, once a Leninist ruling party cut from the same 
cloth as the Communist Party of China (CPC) across the strait, is now the loyal 
democratic opposition. 
Nonetheless, symbols of the former KMT party-state abound, beginning with 
Taiwan’s ROC flag, which is derived from the KMT’s own. Taiwan’s ceremonial 
center is dominated by the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, which celebrates the life 
and rule of a dictator viewed by some as the father of the country but by others as a 
murderous oppressor; there is now a movement to remove Chiang from his positions 
of honor. Another prestigious Taipei institution, the National Chengchi University 
(NCCU), began as the KMT party school and is still closely associated with the party. 
Student protests against lyrics extoling the KMT in the university anthem have 
highlighted similar historical associations between the party and many Taipei-area 
schools. 
It’s no coincidence that these institutions are concentrated in Taipei. As the 
provincial capital, Taipei was the natural place for Chiang to locate his government-
in-exile in 1949. But the role of Taipei, and particularly suburban Taipei, in the KMT’s 
political influence runs much deeper than that. In the wake of the Communist victory 
in the Chinese Civil War, an estimated 2 million people fled from the mainland to 
Taiwan, whose existing population was around 6 million. Many of these new arrivals 
ended up in what was at the time a sleepy, provincial capital: Taipei. 
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Between the censuses of 1946 and 1968, Taipei’s population grew from 272,000 to 
1.6 million. Any visitor to the eastern sprawl of central Taipei can’t help but notice the 
endless blocks of utilitarian 1950s mixed-use residential buildings with small stores 
and workshops on the ground floor. These were built to house the hundreds of 
thousands of mainlanders flooding Taipei, many of them demobilized soldiers and 
their families. Though “old” Taipei institutions like the National Taiwan University—
the former Japanese colonial university—had been centers of resistance to KMT 
rule, they were soon supplemented by “new” Republic of China institutions founded 
to serve Taipei’s burgeoning population. 
The differences between pre-1945 “Taiwan” institutions and post-1945 “ROC” 
institutions reflected how, for decades, Taiwan’s various communities understood 
their own identities. To be Chinese meant to associate with the ROC and ultimately 
with the KMT, while to be Taiwanese meant to associate with local civil society and, 
in extremis, with the former Japanese occupation. Throughout the period of martial 
law from 1949 to 1987 and well into the first decades of democracy, official 
patriotism meant identifying with Taiwan as the ROC, not with Taiwan as Taiwan. 
Even today, the main fault line between the KMT and the DPP is one of identity. 
The first democratically elected president of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, embodies that 
split. Catapulted to office in 1988 by the death of Chiang Kai-shek’s son, under 
whom he served as vice president, Lee was a native Taiwanese technocrat, not a 
KMT politician with a strong base in the party-state. He had served in the Japanese 
army toward the end of World War II as a volunteer officer, not a draftee, and spoke 
Japanese fluently. His career brought him into the KMT at a time when all other 
political parties were banned, but after retiring in 2000 he left to found a new pro-
independence party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). 
Since the emergence of the multiparty democracy that Lee helped foster, Taiwan’s 
politics have been dominated by two broad coalitions, the pan-Blue coalition 
centered on the KMT and the pan-Green coalition centered on the DPP. Lee’s TSU 
is a member of the latter, and Lee is widely considered a mentor to Taiwan’s current 
president, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP. Like Lee, Tsai’s family history is rooted in pre-
war Taiwan. Both figures are “bensheng ren,” or “provincials,” as is most of the core 
leadership of the pan-Green coalition. 
The central leadership of the KMT’s pan-Blue coalition was historically “waisheng 
ren,” or “mainlanders,” but in the 21st century that term is increasingly anachronistic. 
Ma Ying-jeou, the most recent KMT president in office from 2008 to 2016, was born 
in Hong Kong to mainland refugees, and the last two party chairs have been Taiwan 
natives. The KMT may advocate closer cross-Strait relations and eventual 
reunification with the PRC, but it can no longer be caricatured as an authoritarian 
party of die-hard militarists intent on continuing the civil war. With the change in 
generations, history has moved on. 
The “bensheng ren” of the pan-Green coalition are the natural advocates of 
Taiwanese independence, but in reality the dynamic isn’t so simple. Tsai’s DPP 
portrays itself as a pro-independence party, but officially maintains a strategic silence 
on the issue. She prefers to portray Taiwan as being independent already, using this 
stance to sidestep difficult and divisive debates that might tear apart her coalition. 
Hard-core pan-Green activists want a formal declaration of independence and a new 
constitution that replaces the name “Republic of China” with “Taiwan.” More cautious 
mainstream voices prefer gradual change. 
Things are even more complicated for the pan-Blue coalition. In a strange twist of 
fate, the once fiercely anti-communist KMT is now on relatively friendly terms with 
the Communist Party of China (CPC), which vilifies Tsai’s more open and liberal 
DPP. The KMT and CPC even hold an annual joint forum to discuss cross-Strait 
issues. At the 2016 forum—the first after Tsai took office—the chair of the KMT 
actually met with Chinese President Xi Jinping; by contrast, China has shunned or 
closed down official communication channels with the DPP. In the annals of strange 
bedfellows, the blossoming romance between the KMT and the CPC ranks as one of 
the strangest. 
Common Dreams? 
What the KMT and the CPC have in common, of course, is a historical commitment 
to the reunification of China and Taiwan. But it’s not clear how much either side is 
really committed to this goal. The KMT and the CPC both seem to have reconciled 
with the status quo just as much as with each other. 
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The KMT has recently dropped all references to One China from its official party 
platform, opting instead for the much more modest goal of a “reaching a peace 
agreement” with the PRC. This has been a bitter pill for party stalwarts to swallow, 
but it reflects the simple reality that virtually no one in Taiwan wants to be governed 
from Beijing—and there is no chance of China ever being ruled from Taipei. These 
days, the KMT stance on cross-Strait relations seems to boil down to a sensible 
“don’t rock the boat” focus on business development. 
China, too, seems satisfied with the current arrangements. Though Beijing routinely 
threatens to invade Taiwan if it ever declares “independence”—a term intentionally 
left undefined by both sides—it has done little to build the necessary military capacity 
to do so. China’s massive naval construction program seems to be aimed at the 
development of prestige weapons like aircraft carriers, not the building of such 
workaday vessels as landing craft and supply ships. China could potentially pound 
Taiwan with rockets, but that would do little to bring the island back—on the contrary, 
it would permanently destroy any hope of eventual reunification, no matter how 
distant the prospect. 
As a substitute for reunification, Beijing has embraced the so-called “1992 
consensus”: the live-and-let-live principle that has governed cross-Strait relations for 
the past quarter century. Tsai denies the existence of any explicit understanding and 
goes to great lengths never to utter the phrase. But she also avoids mentioning the 
independence issue, insisting that under her watch there will be no change in 
Taiwan’s status. She has repeatedly pledged to maintain the “status quo” while 
declining to define just what that means. She knows that the DPP can only maintain 
a governing majority if it treads lightly on the very issue that defines the party: 
independence for Taiwan. 
Despite this softening of the DPP’s pro-independence rhetoric, China has ratcheted 
up its pressure on Taiwan since Tsai’s May 2016 inauguration, using mainly 
economic tools. Tourist arrivals from China, a mainstay of the Taiwanese 
economy, have declined dramatically over the past year. China denies any official 
meddling in travel approvals, but the decline is almost certainly due to a combination 
of government pressure and negative state-media coverage of the new 
administration in Taipei. China is also exerting greater pressure on Taiwan’s few 
diplomatic allies to switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing. 
It is tempting to see Taiwan’s declining trade with China as another sign of Chinese 
retribution for the DPP’s less-accommodating approach to relations with Beijing. But 
considering that China’s imports declined 5.5 percent across the board in 2016, 
there is little reason to believe that it is targeting Taiwan in particular. China’s 
economy is slowing, taking with it the country’s capacity to absorb Taiwanese 
investment and expertise. 
If China generally doesn’t bother to actively promote reunification, it’s probably 
because leaders in Beijing have come to realize that it is never going to happen, 
even if they feel politically constrained to reiterate timeworn slogans about the 
territorial integrity of China. More than three-quarters of Taiwan’s population was 
born after 1949, and more than 90 percent came of age on the island, making pre-
1949 China the distant memory of a dying generation. Beijing may have a 
reasonable legal case to sovereignty over the physical island of Taiwan, but it has 
little moral claim over its current inhabitants. 
What’s more, the people of Taiwan are increasingly turning their backs on China. 
According to annual surveys conducted by the NCCU, support for immediate 
reunification is less than 2 percent, and for gradual reunification just 8.5 percent, 
compared to a total pro-unification figure of 22 percent in 1996. The proportion of the 
population identifying as “Chinese” has fallen even more steeply, from around one-
quarter in the early 1990s to 3.4 percent today. 
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The big shift over the past 25 years has been in the proportion of Taiwan’s 
population that defines itself as being exclusively Taiwanese—rising from under 20 
percent in 1992 to above 50 percent in 2009. It hovers around 60 percent today. It’s 
no wonder, then, that the KMT has stopped pushing reunification and started to 
diversify its message. Given that its very name means “nationalist party,” it would be 
doomed to demographic oblivion if voters continued to construe the nation in the 
party’s name to be China. 
Nowhere is the battle over Taiwan’s identity fought more bitterly than in the writing of 
history textbooks. In 2015, Ma Ying-jeou’s outgoing administration rushed through a 
major revision of the country’s history and civics textbooks, anticipating that the KMT 
was almost certain to lose its grip on power in the looming 2016 elections. The 
changes were widely perceivedas intended to foster a sense that Taiwan’s roots 
were in China, and that the KMT was the peaceful guardian of that noble heritage. 
One year later, the DPP government reversed the textbook rewrite on its first full day 
in office. Four students who had led protests against the 2015 reforms have been 
appointed to a panel that will now oversee a DPP-led textbook revision. The new 
books should be ready by the end of the decade, just in time for the next national 
elections in 2020. 
Whatever the academic merits of the warring textbook plans, the competition itself 
illustrates the degree to which national identity is politicized in Taiwan. Despite 
serious problems like wage stagnation, youth unemployment, air pollution, nuclear-
waste disposal and the funding of social services for an aging population, Taiwan’s 
two major political parties remain mired in the conflict over identity. Perhaps as a 
result, the approval rating for the current DPP government comes in at just 35 
percent, a minor improvement over the KMT before it, which left office with around 
20 percent popularity. Like their peers throughout the democratic world, Taiwan’s 
voters seem to be increasingly dissatisfied with the electoral choices on offer. 
It’s the Economy, Stupid 
Taiwan is a moderately prosperous country with a GDP per capita of around 
$22,000—richer than Portugal, but poorer than Spain. The cost of living is relatively 
low; GDP per capita rises to $48,000 when measured on a purchasing power parity 
basis. Taiwan’s economy is no longer growing at “Asian Tiger” rates, but 
the expected 2 percent growth rate for 2017 represents a solid performance, 
especially when compared to many other developed countries. So why are voters so 
dissatisfied? 
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In Taiwan, as in so many other developed countries, the economy may be growing 
but wages are not. While its 12 percent youth unemployment rate might seem low by 
European standards today, it is high compared to Taiwan’s own historical 
experience and has driven many to relocate to China to find work. No one knows 
how many have gone, though unsourced estimates indicate more than 1 million, or 
10 percent of the labor force. Taiwanese who relocate to China to make serious 
money are called “taishang”—“Taiwan businesspeople”—but anecdotes suggest that 
many others are ordinary young workers, especially in the service sector. 
The fact that so many Taiwanese rely on China for jobs creates a high level of 
economic dependence—and uncertainty. In the Western imagination, cross-Strait 
relations are all about aircraft carriers and invasion fleets. But in Taiwan, the issues 
are much more down to earth. Bad relations with China threaten people’s livelihoods, 
but dependence on Beijing limits Taipei’s policy options. Nothing highlights this 
conundrum better than the failed 2013 Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement 
(CSSTA) and the 2014 student protests that sank it. 
The CSSTA was one of two projected follow-ups to the landmark 2010 Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement that regularized and liberalized trade between 
China and Taiwan. The CSSTA would have set specific terms governing trade in 
services; the other, now-abandoned follow-up would have done the same for goods. 
The KMT government’s heavy-handed attempt to ram the CSSTA through Taiwan’s 
parliament sparked protests and a student occupation, dubbed the Sunflower 
Movement, that lasted 24 days. 
On its surface, the student movement might seem an oddly passionate response to a 
legislative maneuver being used to force a vote on a highly technical economic 
treaty. But the pressures that prompted it were much more visceral than political. At 
first glance, the CSSTA actually seems to be more favorable to Taiwan than to 
China, prompting fears that it was a kind of Trojan horse meant to make Taiwan ever 
more dependent on access to China’s economy. The Sunflower Movement may be 
the only example in history of people protesting a trade agreement on the grounds 
that it would generate too much investment and too many jobs. 
Those jobs will now have to come from somewhere else. In a probably vain attempt 
to find them, the Tsai regime has fallen back on the perennial favorite of pan-Green 
politics: the Go South strategy, in which Taiwanese politicians seeking to reduce the 
role of China in Taiwan’s economy repeatedly look to Southeast Asia for economic 
partnerships. Lee Teng-hui did it in the 1990s, Chen Shui-bian did it in the 2000s, 
and Tsai Ing-wen is trying it again today. 
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There is some evidence that economic ties with Southeast Asia, particularly 
Vietnam, are expanding as those with China stall. But Southeast Asian markets are 
simply too small—and Southeast Asian countries too poor—to replace China as the 
main outlet for Taiwan’s investment and exports. And Taiwan is not the only country 
moving south: Japanese, Korean and Western firms are also diversifying out of 
China, attracted by low wages and compliant governments in Southeast Asia. 
Taiwan may even be at a disadvantage in this crowded space: In 2014, anti-Chinese 
mobs in Vietnam attacked Taiwanese factories, apparently believing them to be 
Chinese. 
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan all have fraught economic and political relationships 
with China. In each case the reasons are different, but the end result is the same. 
The challenges that Taiwan faces across the Strait are very real, but are not 
significantly larger than those faced by Japan and South Korea. Taiwan’s economy 
is in better shape than Japan’s, and its security situation is better than South 
Korea’s. There is no denying the difficulty of Taiwan’s position vis-a-vis China, but 
Taipei is hardly unique in having to learn how to handle a larger and sometimes 
overbearing neighbor. Countries around the world face similar challenges, and 
Taiwan, with its high-tech economy and educated population, is as well-equipped to 
handle them as anyone else. 
Facts on the Ground—and in the Sea 
What is unique about Taiwan, of course, is its uncertain status as a de facto but 
unrecognized state. There’s no point in questioning Taiwan’s statehood: It has a fully 
elaborated, multilevel governing bureaucracy that collects taxes, pays pensions, 
maintains armed forces and enforces civil order. In short, Taiwan is decisively a state 
and a country; the only question is what country it is. 
From a constitutional standpoint, Taiwan maintains the myth that it is the Republic of 
China. No one really believes this anymore, not even the KMT. The DPP talks about 
self-determination for Taiwan, but in office it has done little to make that a reality. 
Though international observers relentlessly stoke fears of a cross-Strait war, there 
are no signs of any preparations for conflict on either side. An actual shooting battle 
between China and Taiwan would be economically disastrous and militarily 
inconclusive, and both sides know it. Even such an unlikely scenario as a Chinese 
occupation of Kinmen, a Taiwanese territory within swimming distance of the 
mainland city of Xiamen, would hardly cause World War III. And there are no signs of 
any such scenario, anyway. 
Taiwan is decisively a state and a country; the 
only question is what country it is. 
 
Instead both sides embrace different versions of a narrative that condemns them to 
the status quo. Even Tsai’s insistence that Taiwan does not need to declare its 
independence because it is already the independent Republic of China is a different 
way of saying the same thing. 
Beijing’s bullying behavior toward Taiwan can only be described as unjust. Were 
China a country of ordinary size and influence, it would not be able to dissuade other 
countries from maintaining normal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. But China is big, 
and its rhetorical commitment to reunification is nothing short of talismanic. For 
China, reunification is like using the word “communist” to describe the Communist 
Party of China. It may no longer have any practical meaning, but those involved are 
too invested in the charade to ever willingly give it up. 
The only hope Taiwan has for becoming a normal country is eventual regime change 
in Beijing, and the most important thing it can do to prepare for that possibility is to 
embrace its identity as Taiwan. Taiwanese, of both the “Blue” and “Green” camps, 
should drop the pretense that their claims have centuries-old historical roots. The 
reality is that Taiwan was born out of the messy events of 1949 and came of age 
during the transition to democracy in the 1990s. It is now a mature, if unfairly 
marginalized, member of the international democratic community. 
Taiwan’s route forward may be more difficult than it should be, but there is no turning 
back. A free and democratic future is the only future for Taiwan. 
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